|  |  | Previous Folio / Nazir Directory / Tractate List / Navigate Site # Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Nazir ### Folio 29a citing Resh Lakish, said: So as to train him to [carry out his] religious duties.1 If so, why should not a woman also be able to do so? — [Resh Lakish] holds that it is a man's duty to train his son to [carry out his] religious duties, but not a woman's duty to train her son.2 Now on R. Johanan's view that it is a [traditional] ruling with regard to the nazirite vow, we can understand why he can do this with his son but not with his daughter,3 but according to Resh Lakish, ought not the same to be true of a daughter? — He holds that it is his duty to train his son, but not to train his daughter. Now on R. Johanan's view that it is a [traditional] ruling with regard to the nazirite, we can understand why he can impose naziriteship [on his son], but not [ordinary] vows;4 but on Resh Lakish's view, why should he not be able [to impose ordinary] vows too? — [The Mishnah] argues progressively.5 Not only is it his duty to train [his son] by [imposing upon him] vows which do not make him unseemly, but it is even his duty to impose a naziriteship, although this will make him unseemly. Now on R. Johanan's view that it is a [traditional] ruling with regard to the nazirite, we can understand how it teaches: IF HE PROTESTS OR HIS RELATIVES PROTEST ON HIS BEHALF [THE NAZIRITESHIP IS VOID];6 but on Resh Lakish's view, as cited by R. Jose son of R. Hanina, have relatives the power to tell [the father] not to instruct [the son] in religious duties? — He holds that [the son] objects to any training which is undignified.7 Now on R. Johanan's view that it is a [traditional] ruling with regard to the nazirite, we can understand why [the boy] is permitted to poll,8 although [this means] rounding [the corners of the head];9 but on Resh Lakish's view as cited by R. Jose son of R. Hanina that it is in order to train him to [carry out his] religious duties, he would be [transgressing] in rounding [the corners of his head]?10 — [Resh Lakish] holds that the rounding of the whole head11 is [prohibited only by] a rabbinic enactment,12 and since training is [a duty] imposed by the Rabbis, [the duty as to] training imposed by the Rabbis can overrule the rabbinic enactment against rounding [the whole head]. Now on R. Johanan's view that it is a [traditional] ruling with regard to the nazirite, we can understand why [the boy] is allowed to poll and offer the sacrifices [of a nazirite]; but on the view of Resh Lakish as cited by R. Jose son of R. Hanina that it is in order to train him to [carry out his] religious duties, he would be bringing profane [animals] into the Temple court?13 — [Resh Lakish] holds that [the prohibition against the bringing of] ordinary animals into the Temple-court is not Scriptural.14 Now on R. Johanan's view that it is a [traditional] ruling with regard to the nazirite, we can understand why if he contracts ritual defilement, he may bring an offering of a pair of birds, which the priest will eat after pinching off [the head];15 but on Resh Lakish's view, as cited by R. Jose son of R. Hanina, he will be eating carrion?16 — [Resh Lakish] agrees with R. Jose son of R. Judah that fowl do not require to be [ritually] slaughtered in Torah law, and considers that [the prohibition against bringing] non-sacred [fowl] into the Temple court is not Scriptural.17 Is this in fact R. Jose's opinion? Has it not been taught: R Jose son of R. Judah said: Whence do we infer that a sin-offering of fowl, brought in a doubtful case [of childbirth]18 is not to be eaten?19 From the verse, And of then that have an issue, whether it be a man or a woman.20 Woman is here compared to man.21 Just as a man is required to bring an offering for [a transgression],22 which has certainly been committed so must the woman bring an offering for [a childbirth] which has certainly occurred;23 and just as there is an offering to be brought by a man after a doubtful [transgression], so must an offering be brought by a woman after a doubtful [childbirth]. Again, just as a man brings [an offering of] the same kind in a case of doubtful [transgression] as he does after a certain one,24 so must a woman bring [an offering of] the same kind after a doubtful [childbirth] as she does after a certain one.25 [Shall we] then [infer further that] just as [in a doubtful case] a man brings an offering that is eaten,26 so is the offering brought by the woman to be eaten? To Part b Original footnotes renumbered. See Structure of the Talmud Files I.e., it is Rabbinic in its origin. And so she has not the power to impose upon him an obligation involving the offering of sacrifices. For the tradition was only known with regard to sons. The Mishnah mentions only naziriteship and not other vows. And the inference that he cannot impose ordinary vows is wrong. This being part of the tradition. On account of the need to shave his head. And so the relatives can protest on his behalf. On completing the term of naziriteship. Which is otherwise forbidden; v. Lev. XIX, 27. [Which vitiates the whole value of the training.] Which is the manner in which a nazirite polls. The Scriptural verse says that 'the corners' are not to be rounded, and this is taken to mean the corners by themselves, but not in conjunction with the rest of the head. I.e., offer profane animals on the altar, for as he is not a nazirite the animals do not become sacred. This is forbidden. And is therefore permitted in this instance. Birds offered as sacrifices were not slaughtered ritually with a knife, but the priest pinched off their heads with his thumb nail. Since there was no obligation to offer birds, these birds are not really an offering and should be killed in the usual way. There is a controversy on this point in Hul. 27b. After childbirth, or even a miscarriage, a mother was required to offer certain sacrifices, including a bird as sin-offering (v. Lev. XII, 6). In this Baraitha R. Jose son of R. Judah explains what is to happen if there is a doubt as to a birth (i.e., a true miscarriage) having taken place (cf. also Ker, I, 1). Although after certain childbirth it was eaten. Lev. XV. 33' I.e., cases in which a man (as well as a woman) is required to furnish an offering, with the ease in which only a woman can do so, viz.: childbirth, When the Torah prescribes an offering for some offence, e.g., the eating of forbidden fat, it is understood that there is to be no doubt that an offence was committed. Where a doubt existed a different offering, the guilt-offering, was prescribed (v. Lev. V, 17). I.e., Lev. XII, 6. which describes the offering, is referring to a certain and not a doubtful childbirth. Viz., an animal (and not a bird) in both cases if the offence is, e.g., the eating of forbidden fat. Including a sin-offering of a bird in both cases. [The flesh of a guilt-offering for a doubtful transgression was eaten, v. Zeb. 54b.] Tractate List / Glossary / / Bible Reference ### Nazir 29b You cannot say so. Whilst this applies in the case of a man where only one forbidden act is involved,1 you cannot argue that this should also be the case with a woman where two forbidden acts are involved. Now what are the two forbidden acts referred to? Are they not the prohibition against the eating of carrion,2 and the prohibition against the entry of profane [sacrifices] into the Temple court?3 R. Aha, the son of R. Ika [however] demurred [to this inference4 being drawn], for it is surely possible that [the eating was forbidden]5 because it would appear as though two rabbinic enactments were being transgressed.6 Can we say that [the controversy between R. Johanan and Resh Lakish] is the same as that between [the following] Tannaim? [For it has been taught:] Rabbi says that he can impose a nazirite vow on his son until his majority;7 but R. Jose son of R. Judah says, [only] until he reaches the age of making vows [for himself].8 Now surely [the controversy between R. Johanan and Resh Lakish] is the same as [that between these] Tannaim, Rabbi considering it to be a [traditional] ruling with regard to the nazirite, so that though [the son] may have reached the age of making vows [for himself, the father] can still impose a [nazirite] vow on him until he attains his majority, whereas R. Jose son of R. Judah who asserts [that he can do so only] until [the son] reaches the age of making vows [for himself] is of the opinion that [the father may impose a naziriteship] in order to train him to [carry out his] religious duties, and, now that he has passed out of his [father's] control,9 there is no longer an obligation [to train him]?10 — I will tell you; not at all. Both [Rabbi and R. Jose son of R. Judah may] agree that this is a [traditional] ruling with regard to the nazirite. Where they differ is about [the vows of] one who can discriminate11 [but] who has not quite reached manhood. Rabbi considers that [a youth] who can discriminate [but] who has not quite reached manhood is [permitted to make vows] only by enactment of the Rabbis and so the right granted by the Torah [to the parent]12 overrules the Rabbinical right [of the youth];13 whereas R. Jose son of R. Judah considers that [a youth] who can discriminate [but] who has not quite reached manhood, has a Scriptural right [to make vows].14 Alternatively, it may be that both [Rabbi and R. Jose son of R. Judah] would agree that [the father may impose a naziriteship] in order to train him to [carry out his] religious duties, and that [the right of a youth,] who can discriminate [but] who has not quite reached manhood, [to make vows] is Rabbinic. Rabbi, on the one hand, holds that [the parent's duty] to train, which is itself Rabbinic, overrules [the right of the youth,] who can discriminate [but] who has not quite reached manhood, [to make vows for himself] which is also Rabbinic;15 whilst R. Jose son of R. Judah, who says [that the father's right lasts only] until [the lad] reaches the age of making vows, holds that the Rabbinic duty to train [the lad] does not set aside [the right of a youth] who can discriminate [but] who has not quite reached manhood [to make his own vows, although this is also Rabbinic].16 Can we say that [the controversy between] the above Tannaim17 is the same as that between the following Tannaim?18 For it has been taught: It is related that R. Hanina's father once imposed a nazirite vow upon him and then brought him before R. Gamaliel. R. Gamaliel was about to examine him to discover whether or not he had reached his majority19 — according to R. Jose20 it was to discover whether he had reached the age of making vows21 — when [the young Hanina] said to him, 'Sir, do not exert yourself to examine me. If I am a minor, then I am a nazirite because of my father's [imposition], whilst if I am an adult,22 I undertake it on my own account.' Thereupon R. Gamaliel rose and kissed him upon his head, and said, 'I am certain that this [lad] will be a religious leader23 in Israel.' It is said that in a very short space of time, he became in fact a religious leader in Israel.24 Now on R. Jose son of R. Judah's view that [the father's control lasts only] until [the boy] reaches the age at which he can make vows [for himself], we can understand why he should have said, 'If I am a minor,25 I shall be [a nazirite] because of my father's [action, and so on].' But on Rabbi's view that [it lasts] until manhood, [of what value was the statement], 'whilst if I am an adult, I undertake it on my own account,' - To Next Folio - Original footnotes renumbered. See Structure of the Talmud Files If he was not in fact guilty, a profane animal was sacrificed on his behalf. This the Tanna of the Baraitha considers is forbidden. The bird, having its neck pinched, is carrion, pinching being only permitted to a true sacrificial bird. And thus we see that R. Jose considers both these acts forbidden by the Torah, in contradiction to the statement attributed to him above. That the above acts are forbidden by the Torah. Our text has, instead of this inserted phrase, 'She is liable', which gives no sense. We have therefore followed all the commentators and omitted it. I.e., the eating of the bird brought by the woman was forbidden not because the comparison with the guilt-offering brought by the man did not extend to cover it, but because two enactments of the Rabbis were involved, and this outweighs the analogy with the guilt-offering. Lit., 'until two hairs appear', i.e., until there is definite evidence that he has reached puberty, usually after the end of the thirteenth year. I.e., between the twelfth and thirteenth birthdays, when he understands the significance of a vow. For he can now make his own vows. And therefore he cannot impose one. I.e., who realises the significance of a vow. To impose a naziriteship. A halachah or traditional ruling has the force of a scriptural enactment. To make vow's himself. And when he reaches this age, his father can no longer impose a naziriteship upon him. And the father can impose a naziriteship until the boy is thirteen. And when the boy reaches the age of making vows, the father's right to impose a naziriteship ceases. Rabbi and R. Jose son of R. Judah. This is put as a question although the answer in this case is not negative. This is not uncommon (Asheri). Lit., 'produced two hairs', as a sign of puberty. On this view, he was thirteen years old at the time. I.e., R. Jose son of R. Judah. V. Tosaf. The boy was only twelve years old according to R. Jose. In regard to making vows. Lit., will render halachic decisions.' Tosef. Nid. V. It is here supposed that all the young R. Hanina meant was, 'If I cannot yet make vows myself,' no special significance attaching to his use of the word minor'. Tractate List / Glossary / / Bible Reference |  |  |