|  |  | Previous Folio / Baba Kamma Directory / Tractate List / Navigate Site # Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Baba Kamma ### Folio 83a [where] either the Holy Tongue or the Greek language [could be employed]?' And R. Jose said: 'Why use the Aramaic language in Babylon [where] the Holy Tongue or the Persian language [could be used]?' — It may, however, be said that the Greek language is one thing and Grecian Wisdom is another. But was Grecian Wisdom proscribed? Did not Rab Judah say that Samuel stated in the name of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel: '[The words] Mine eye affected my soul because of all the daughters of my city 1 [could very well be applied to the] thousand youths who were in my father's house; five hundred of them learned Torah and the other five hundred learned Grecian Wisdom, and out of all of them there remain only I here and the son of my father's brother in Asia'?2 — It may, however, be said that the family of R. Gamaliel was an exception, as they had associations with the Government, as indeed taught: 'He who trims the front of his hair3 in Roman fashion is acting in the ways of the Amorites.'4 Abtolmus b. Reuben however was permitted to cut his hair in the Gentile fashion as he was in close contact with the Government. So also the members of the family of Rabban Gamaliel were permitted to discuss Grecian Wisdom on account of their having had associations with the Government. NO MAN SHOULD BREED A DOG UNLESS IT IS ON A CHAIN etc. Our Rabbis taught: No man should breed a dog unless it is kept on a chain. He may, however, breed it in a town adjoining the frontier where he should keep it chained during the daytime and loose it only at night. It was taught: R. Eliezer the Great says that he who breeds dogs is like him who breeds swine. What is the practical bearing of this comparison? — That he5 be declared cursed.6 R. Joseph b. Manyumi said in the name of R. Nahman that Babylon was on a par with a town adjoining the frontier.7 This, however, was interpreted to refer to Nehardea. R. Dostai of Bira8 expounded: And when it rested, he said, Return O Lord unto the tens of thousands [and] the thousands of Israel.9 This, [he said,] teaches that the Shechinah 10 does not rest upon Israel if they are less than two thousand plus two tens of thousands.11 Were therefore the Israelites [to be twenty-two thousand] less one, and there was there among them a pregnant woman thus capable of completing the number, but a dog barked at her and she miscarried, the [dog] would in this case cause the Shechinah to depart from Israel. A certain woman12 entered a neighbour's house to bake [there bread], and a dog suddenly barked at her, but the owner of the house said to her: Do not be afraid of the dog as its teeth are gone. She, however, said to him: Take thy kindness and throw it on the thorns, for the embryo has already been moved [from its place]. IT IS NOT RIGHT TO PLACE NETS FOR DOVES UNLESS AT A DISTANCE OF THIRTY RIS FROM INHABITED SETTLEMENTS. But do they proceed so far? Did we not learn that a dove-cote must be kept at a distance from the town of fifty cubits?13 — Abaye said: They certainly fly much further than that, but they eat their fill within fifty cubits.14 But do they fly only thirty ris and no more? Was it not taught: 'Where there is an inhabited settlement no net must be spread even for a distance of a hundred mil'? — R. Joseph said: The latter statement refers to a settlement of vineyards;15 Rabbah said that it refers to a settlement of dove-cotes.15 But why not lay down the prohibition to spread nets on account of the dovecotes themselves?16 — If you like I can say that they belong to Cutheans,17 or if you like I can say that they are ownerless, or if you again like I can say that they are his own. To Part b Original footnotes renumbered. See Structure of the Talmud Files Lam. III, 51. Sot. 49b and Git. 58a. [This proves that even Grecian Wisdom was not proscribed.] [Like a fringe on the forehead and lets the curls hang down on the temples (Jast.).] Which should not be imitated. Who breeds a dog. As if he would breed swine. Cf. 'Er. 45a. [In Galilee, v. Klein, op. cit., p. 39.] Num. x, 36; E.V.: unto the many thousands of Israel. The Divine Presence. I.e., twenty-two thousand, comprising the minimum of the plural tens of thousands which is twenty thousand and the minimum of the thousands which is two thousand, cf. also Yeb. 64a. Cf. Shab. 63a; and supra p. 271. So that the doves should not consume the produce of the town. (B.B. 11, 5.] On account of which a dove-cote need not be kept away from the town for more than fifty cubits. Where the doves could thus take rest and fly on to great distances. Why then base the prohibition upon the proximity of a settlement? Who did not recognise the necessity of being scrupulous to such an extent and should therefore not be treated better than they treated others: cf. supra p. 211, n. 6. [For a full discussion of the regulations laid down in our Mishnah and developed in the Gemara, as well as their application in the practical life of the Jewish communities in Talmudic times, v. Krauss, REJ, LIII, 14-55.] Tractate List / Glossary / / Bible Reference ### Baba Kamma 83b ## CHAPTER VIII MISHNAH. ONE WHO INJURES A FELLOW MAN BECOMES LIABLE TO HIM FOR FIVE ITEMS: FOR DEPRECIATION, FOR PAIN, FOR HEALING, FOR LOSS OF TIME AND FOR DEGRADATION. HOW IS IT WITH 'DEPRECIATION'? IF HE PUT OUT HIS EYE, CUT OFF HIS ARM OR BROKE HIS LEG, THE INJURED PERSON IS CONSIDERED AS IF HE WERE A SLAVE BEING SOLD IN THE MARKET PLACE, AND A VALUATION IS MADE AS TO HOW MUCH HE WAS WORTH [PREVIOUSLY]. AND HOW MUCH HE IS WORTH [NOW]. 'PAIN' — IF HE BURNT HIM EITHER WITH A SPIT OR WITH A NAIL, EVEN THOUGH ON HIS [FINGER] NAIL WHICH IS A PLACE WHERE NO BRUISE COULD BE MADE, IT HAS TO BE CALCULATED HOW MUCH A MAN OF EQUAL STANDING WOULD REQUIRE TO BE PAID TO UNDERGO SUCH PAIN. 'HEALING' — IF HE HAS STRUCK HIM, HE IS UNDER OBLIGATION TO PAY MEDICAL EXPENSES. SHOULD ULCERS [MEANWHILE] ARISE ON HIS BODY, IF AS A RESULT OF THE WOUND, THE OFFENDER WOULD BE LIABLE, BUT IF NOT AS A RESULT OF THE WOUND, HE WOULD BE EXEMPT. WHERE THE WOUND WAS HEALED BUT REOPENED, HEALED AGAIN BUT REOPENED, HE WOULD STILL BE UNDER OBLIGATION TO HEAL HIM. IF, HOWEVER, IT HAD COMPLETELY HEALED [BUT HAD SUBSEQUENTLY REOPENED] HE WOULD NO MORE BE UNDER OBLIGATION TO HEAL HIM. 'LOSS OF TIME' — THE INJURED PERSON IS CONSIDERED AS IF HE WERE A WATCHMAN OF CUCUMBER BEDS1 [SO THAT THE LOSS OF SUCH WAGES2 SUSTAINED BY HIM DURING THE PERIOD OF ILLNESS MAY BE REIMBURSED TO HIM]. FOR THERE HAS ALREADY BEEN PAID TO HIM THE VALUE OF HIS HAND OR THE VALUE OF HIS LEG [THROUGH WHICH DEPRIVATION HE WOULD NO MORE BE ABLE TO CARRY ON HIS PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT]. 'DEGRADATION' — ALL TO BE ESTIMATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATUS OF THE OFFENDER AND THE OFFENDED. GEMARA. Why [pay compensation]? Does the Divine Law not say 'Eye for eye'?3 Why not take this literally to mean [putting out] the eye [of the offender]? — Let not this enter your mind, since it has been taught: You might think that where he put out his eye, the offender's eye should be put out, or where he cut off his arm, the offender's arm should be cut off, or again where he broke his leg, the offender's leg should be broken. [Not so; for] it is laid down, 'He that smiteth any man…' 'And he that smiteth a beast …'4 just as in the case of smiting a beast compensation is to be paid, so also in the case of smiting a man compensation is to be paid.5 And should this [reason] not satisfy you,6 note that it is stated, 'Moreover ye shall take no ransom for the life of a murderer, that is guilty of death',7 implying that it is only for the life of a murderer that you may not take 'satisfaction',8 whereas you may take 'satisfaction' [even] for the principal limbs, though these cannot be restored.' To what case of 'smiting' does it refer? If to [the Verse] 'And he that killeth a beast, shall make it good: and he that killeth a man, shall be put to death',9 does not this verse refer to murder?10 — The quotation was therefore made from this text: And he that smiteth a beast mortally shall make it good: life for life,11 which comes next to and if a man maim his neighbour: as he hath done so shall it be done to him.12 But is [the term] 'smiting' mentioned in the latter text?12 — We speak of the effect of smiting implied in this text and of the effect of smiting implied in the other text: just as smiting mentioned in the case of beast refers to the payment of compensation, so also does smiting in the case of man refer to the payment of compensation. But is it not written: And he that smiteth13 any man mortally shall surely be put to death 14 [which, on account of the fact that the law of murder is not being dealt with here,15 surely refers to cases of mere injury and means Retaliation]?16 — [Even this refers to the payment of] pecuniary compensation. How [do you know that it refers] to pecuniary compensation? Why not say that it really means capital punishment?17 — Let not this enter your mind; first, because it is compared to the case dealt with in the text, 'He that smiteth13 a beast mortally shall make it good', and furthermore, because it is written soon after, 'as he hath done so shall it be done to him',18 thus proving that it means pecuniary compensation. But what is meant by the statement, 'if this reason does not satisfy you'? [Why should it not satisfy you?] — The difficulty which further occurred to the Tanna was as follows: What is your reason for deriving the law of man injuring man from the law of smiting a beast and not from the law governing the case of killing a man [where Retaliation is the rule]? I would answer: It is proper to derive [the law of] injury18 from [the law governing another case of] injury,19 and not to derive [the law of] injury18 from [the law governing the case of] murder. It could, however, be argued to the contrary; [that it is proper] to derive [the law of injury inflicted upon] man from [another case of] man but not to derive [the law of injury inflicted upon] man from [the case of] beast. This was the point of the statement 'If, however, this reason does not satisfy you.' [The answer is as follows:] 'It is stated: Moreover ye shall take no ransom for the life of a murderer that is guilty of death; but he shall surely be put to death, implying that it was only 'for the life of a murderer' that you may not take ransom whereas you may take ransom [even] for principal limbs though these cannot be restored.' But was the purpose of this [verse], Moreover ye shall take no ransom for the life of a murderer, to exclude the case of principal limbs? Was it not requisite that the Divine Law should state that you should not make him20 subject to two punishments, i.e. that you should not take from him pecuniary compensation as well as kill him? — This, however, could be derived from the verse, According to his crime,21 [which implies that] you can make him liable for one crime but cannot make him liable for two crimes.22 But still was it not requisite that the Divine Law should state that you should not take pecuniary compensation from him and release him from the capital punishment? — If so the Divine Law would have written, 'Moreover ye shall take no satisfaction for him who is guilty [and deserving] of death'; why then write 'for the life of a murderer' unless to prove from it that it is only 'for the life of a murderer' that you may not take ransom, whereas you may take ransom [even] for principal limbs though these could not be restored? But since it was written, Moreover ye shall take no ransom [implying the law of pecuniary compensation in the case of mere injury], why do I require [the analogy made between] 'smiting' [in the case of injuring man and] 'smiting' [in the case of injuring beast]? — It may be answered that if [the law would have had to be derived only] from the former text, I might have said that the offender has the option, so that if he wishes he may pay with the loss of his eye or if he desires otherwise he may pay the value of the eye; we are therefore told [that the inference is] from smiting a beast: just as in the case of smiting a beast the offender is liable for pecuniary compensation so also in the case of injuring a man he is liable for pecuniary compensation. It was taught: R. Dosthai b. Judah says: Eye for eye means pecuniary compensation. You say pecuniary compensation, but perhaps it is not so, but actual retaliation [by putting out an eye] is meant? What then will you say where the eye of one was big and the eye of the other little, for how can I in this case apply the principle of eye for eye? If, however, you say that in such a case pecuniary compensation will have to be taken, did not the Torah state, Ye shall have one manner of law,23 implying that the manner of law should be the same in all cases? I might rejoin: What is the difficulty even in that case? Why not perhaps say that for eyesight taken away the Divine Law ordered eyesight to be taken away from the offender?24 For if you will not say this, - To Next Folio - Original footnotes renumbered. See Structure of the Talmud Files As even a lame or one-armed person could be employed in this capacity. But not of the previous employment on account of the reason which follows. Ex. XXI, 24. Lev. XXIV; for the exact verse see the discussion that follows. But no resort to Retaliation. Lit., 'If it is your desire to say (otherwise).' Num. XXXV, 31. I.e., ransom, and thus release him from capital punishment. Lev. XXIV, 21. Where retaliation actually applies. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. E.V.: 'killeth'. Ibid. 17. As follows in the text, 'Breach for breach, eye for eye' etc. The phrase, 'be put to death', would thus refer exclusively to the limb which has to be sacrificed in retaliation. As indeed appears from the literal meaning of the text. Lev. XXIV, 19. I.e., where Man injured beast. The murderer. Deut. XXV, 2. Cf. Mak. 4b and 13b. Lev. XXIV, 22. Without taking into consideration the sizes of the respective eyes. Tractate List / Glossary / / Bible Reference |  |  |